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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
No. 10-2345
_________

W.R. and K.R., individually and o/b/o H.R.,
Appellants
v.
UNION BEACH BOARD OF EDUCATION, Monmouth County

________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-02268)
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper
_______
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 14, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed February 17, 2011 )
______
OPINION
______
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
W.R. and K.R., individually and on behalf of their minor son H.R., appeal the
District Court’s order granting Union Beach Board of Education’s (“District”) motion for
judgment on the administrative record. We will affirm.
I.
H.R. is a student with multiple disabilities and is eligible for the services and
protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(“IDEA”). In October 2007, appellants filed a “Request for Due Process” challenging the
School District’s individualized education program (“IEP”) for the 2007-08 school year
as not providing H.R. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). Thereafter,
appellants filed another “Request for Due Process” challenging the 2008-09 IEP. The
two matters were consolidated before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).
The ALJ found as a matter of fact “that the 2007-08 and 2008-09 IEPs were
sufficiently reasonably calculated to provide H.R. with a free and appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment.” App. at 51a. Nonetheless, the ALJ
concluded as a matter of law that the District “failed to provide H.R. with a free
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment in the 2007-08 and 200809 school years, in that the [D]istrict has not provided meaningful educational benefit to
H.R.” App. at 60a.
On review, the District Court held that the ALJ’s factual conclusion that the IEPs
were reasonably calculated to provide H.R. with a FAPE in the least restrictive
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environment compelled the conclusion that the IEPs conformed to the requirements of the
IDEA. W.R. v. Union Beach Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 1644138, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 22,
2010). The District Court correctly noted that an IEP “is judged prospectively so that any
lack of progress under a particular IEP, assuming arguendo that there was no progress,
does not render that IEP inappropriate.” Id. at *5 (quoting Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v.
Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir. 1995)). The District Court also rejected appellants’
argument that the District violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA by depriving
the parents of meaningful participation in the IEP process. Id. at *10.
II.1
On appeal, appellants challenge only the District Court’s conclusion that the
parents were not deprived of meaningful participation in the IEPs. Specifically,
appellants contend that they “consistently requested information from the District
regarding the methodology which would be implemented to ensure that H.R. received an
appropriate education” and that the District provided no information regarding its chosen
methodology. Appellants’ Br. at 5.
A procedural violation of the IDEA is actionable only if it impedes the child’s
right to a FAPE, significantly impedes the parents’ right to participation, or causes a
deprivation in benefits. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In an IDEA case, we exercise plenary review over
questions of law, but review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error. Shore
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004).
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(2007). The District Court concluded that the parents were provided with a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the IEP process and the District’s IEPs contained an
instructional methodology, of which the parents were informed.
As evidence that they were denied meaningful participation and never informed of
the teaching methodology, appellants point to letters sent from appellants’ attorney to the
District, asking “[w]hat program or method of instruction are you using to remediate
[H.R.’s] problem with reading?” Admin. R. at 344, 373. However, these same letters
demonstrate that the parents, their lawyers, and the District had numerous meetings and
correspondence regarding the substance of the IEP. The parents participated in IEP
meetings for both the 2007-08 and 2008-09 school years. The parents and the District
also communicated extensively about the details of H.R.’s reading program before the
first due process petition was ever filed. Moreover, the District specifically informed the
parents of the methodology they would employ: “As stated in the IEP, H.R. will receive
a multi-sensory reading program that will utilize techniques from the Wilson Reading
Program and other multi-sensory programs. . . . H.R. will receive reading instruction five
(5) times a week for forty-five (45) minutes a day. The sessions will be in a small group
in the resource room. At this time, the other students in the group are at approximately
the same level as H.R.” Admin. R. at 375. Indeed, the facts, as articulated by the ALJ
and not challenged by the parties on appeal, evince a considerable back-and-forth
between the District and the parents regarding the best method for teaching H.R.
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These communications demonstrate both significant parent involvement and that
the District communicated the methodology it sought to implement through the IEP,
albeit a methodology with which the parents disagreed. However, as has been
established, “once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met”
neither parents nor courts have a right to compel a school district to employ a specific
methodology in educating a student. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982).
Accordingly, the District Court appropriately concluded that the parents were
meaningfully involved in the IEP process and were informed of the District’s proposed
educational methodology.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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